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Abstract: 
Why is the Euro area economy laboring under the burden of fiscal austerity? Critics argue 
that an ideological bias towards austerity has been institutionalized in the EU’s fiscal 
rules. We examine this claim by contrasting a ‘disciplinarian’ account of fiscal 
surveillance with a welfare-maximising approach and using this to review how fiscal 
surveillance by the European Commission has been practiced since the financial crisis. 
While we find that Eurostat’s practices bear some marks of disciplinarianism, particularly 
in bringing the fiscal consequences of reckless behavior by banks into the beam of the 
fiscal surveillance lamp, the Commission’s welfare maximising orientation is reflected in 
its efforts to identify and partition out financial, macroeconomic and budgetary 
contributions to fiscal outturns and thereby avoid an excessively disciplinarian 
orientation. Its efforts are impeded by a lack of supranational institutions to resolve bank 
failures and conduct countercyclical policy. These institutional deficits, rather than an 
entrenched ideological standpoint, explain the persistence of austerity. 
 
 
Introduction 
For some years now, commentators have been discussing the failure of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) and how to reform it. A systematic analysis of ‘101 proposals to 
reform’ conducted in 2006 identified a fundamental disagreement between two groups of 
economists: those who sought to specify a welfare-maximising path for fiscal policy in 
the light of macroeconomic objectives, and those who adopted the disciplinarian 
perspective1 that governments’ incentives created a tendency to fiscal profligacy that 
needed to be reined in (Fischer et al 2006). At that time, it seemed that the welfare-
maximisers had won the day. The SGP was revised in ways which expanded the scope 
for exemptions in applying the deficit and debt limits specified in the Maastricht Treaty. 
There was more emphasis on medium-term outturns, leaving space for demand 
management in the short run. There were also more possibilities to differentiate between 
countries in evaluating their fiscal positions: those with lower debt would not be called to 
account so readily for deficits. Disciplinarians were also disappointed that there were few 
                                                 
*
 We are most grateful for comments by Pepper Culpepper (EUI),  Phillip Genschel (Jacobs University), 
Peter Hall (Harvard), and Markus Jachtenfuchs (Hertie School of Governance) for comments on earlier 
versions of this chapter, as well as the participants in two workshops convened by Martin Rhodes (Denver) 
and Jim Caporaso (Seattle).    
1
 Fischer et al (2006) refer to the disciplinarian perspective as ‘political economy’, using the term to dignify 
political analysis as done by neoclassical economists. This is not a usage we are inclined to perpetuate. 
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institutional changes: the Council retained the final vote over measures, which they 
claimed was like ‘asking turkeys to vote on the menu for Christmas’. 
 
One explanation for the outcome of the 2005 reforms was that, at that time, there was 
much more concern about growth than debt in the euro area (EA) (Fischer et al 2006: 25). 
Another was that fiscal surveillance had to adjust to the lack of carrots and sticks, since 
the carrot of euro membership had been consumed. Attention shifted to embedding the 
statistical and analytical practices of good fiscal governance by strengthening the 
networks of the regulatory state (Schelkle 2009). The financial crisis was a shock to this 
settlement. Debt sustainability, which had been embraced by welfare-maximizers as a 
medium-term target that would shift the focus from year-on-year budget outturns, became 
an immediate imperative. Growth is evidently a concern and disagreements over the 
appropriate strategy of crisis management are virulent, but the climate seemed to shift 
decisively in the disciplinarian direction.  
 
Reforms to fiscal surveillance in 2010-11 introduced several of the institutional measures 
that disciplinarians advocated, as we describe in section 2 below. Critics argued that 
Europe was laboring under an ‘austerity delusion’ (Blyth 2013): an ideology that holds 
that macroeconomic problems always have their origins in a lack of fiscal discipline. 
Krugman (2013) writes of a ‘Rehn of Terror’, perversely flattering the former Vice 
President and Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and the Euro for his role 
in the excessive enforcement of budgetary retrenchment in the Southern periphery. In 
focusing on fiscal discipline after a crisis caused by banks, the Commission seems like 
the drunk who looks for his lost keys under the lamp-post, not because he can be sure that 
they are there but because “that’s where the light is”. 
 
We show in this chapter that, despite the reforms, fiscal surveillance has continued to 
disappoint disciplinarians. Our explanation centers on the self-understanding of the EU as 
a regulatory polity that is charged with promoting good economic governance in member 
states (Mabbett and Schelkle 2009, Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013). To this end, the 
European Commission is set up as a non-elected body, and as a trustee with discretionary 
powers rather than an agency of the member states (Majone 2001). This fits neither the 
intergovernmentalist nor the supranationalist script (see Caporaso and Rhodes in this 
volume). The Commission enforces the commitments that elected governments have 
signed up to, but only to the extent that these commitments do not obviously harm 
economies and are in line with the economic consensus of the day. However, it has 
proved impossible to implement a welfare-maximising fiscal policy in response to the 
financial crisis, given the EA’s current institutional arrangements. The impact of bank 
rescues on government finances, combined with the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in 
achieving macroeconomic stabilization, have produced persistent deficits in many 
countries. These would not prevent countercyclical fiscal expansion if they could readily 
be financed, but several states have fallen hostage to bond market crises. These crises 
have been the proximate cause of austerity, not fiscal rules.        
  
Ideally, the fiscal surveillance process would isolate the effects of governments’ 
budgetary decision-making from the effects of the EA’s fragile monetary and financial 
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system. In practice, fiscal accounting for the financial crisis works in the opposite way, 
drawing in rather than separating out these wider developments. The explanation is that 
governments are suspected of a proclivity to hide their claims on resources in places 
where the fiscal surveillance lamp-post does not shine. The response of statisticians has 
been to establish a comprehensive definition of ‘general government’ which extends 
beyond the ambit of budgets to take in all manner of ‘non-market’ entities. Actions that 
originate with market actors but have fiscal consequences can then also come under the 
purview of fiscal surveillance. Because outturns are always seen through the lens of 
government behavior, a disciplinarian orientation is embedded in accounting practices, 
even though the judgments made by the Commission when it evaluates these outturns 
reflect a welfare-maximising orientation. 
 
Our discussion falls into four main sections. In the next, we provide a brief account of the 
reforms to fiscal governance that have taken place in the radically changed political 
environment created by the crisis, which has divided the union into guarantor and 
program countries. We highlight the uneasy relationship between Germany and the 
Commission, focusing on developments in fiscal surveillance ‘proper’ –  the set of rules 
governing all members of the EA – which are distinct from the emergence of fiscal 
conditionality in other forms, such as the Macroeconomic Adjustment Programs (MAPs) 
imposed on borrower countries and the conditions that the ECB has tried to impose in 
return for bond market support (see Henning, this volume).  
 
In section 3, we examine how the statistical process of measuring the fiscal stance has 
been affected by bank bailouts and recapitalizations that have strong and uneven effects. 
Eurostat strives to apply internationally agreed standards consistently. We show, 
however, that accounting conventions of deficit and debt measurement tend to produce 
harsher assessments in weaker economies.  
 
Section 4 considers the implications of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy since the 
financial crisis. The regime established by the SGP assumed that the primary task of 
macroeconomic stabilization would fall to monetary policy. The persistence of economic 
stagnation since the crisis has led technical and political disagreements to emerge around 
the cyclical adjustment of fiscal indicators.  
 
Section 5 turns to the puzzle of why, despite these known problems with searching under 
the fiscal surveillance lamppost, macroeconomic regulation in the EA retains such a 
strong fiscal focus. Our explanation is that, even though moral hazard on the part of 
banks is known to have been the driver of the crisis, there remains the mutual suspicion 
that this might provide cover for fiscal irresponsibility on the part of governments. We 
argue that attempts to partition out the financial, monetary and budgetary contributions to 
fiscal outturns are impeded by a lack of supranational resources and capacities. 
 
We conclude that, while the European institutions do not labor under an ideological 
austerity delusion, fiscal surveillance remains the main mechanism for dealing with 
spillovers between member states’ policies. In that sense, the Euro area is trapped under 
the lamp-post. 
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2 Searching under the lamp-post 
Before we outline the reforms that created the impression of an obsession with 
counterproductive fiscal restraint, it is worth recalling how they came about. There were 
at least two phases to the EU’s crisis management: a first phase of Keynesian stimulus 
and a second phase when the emphasis shifted to fiscal discipline. In the second phase, 
not only did the macroeconomic orientation shift, but also institutional conflict emerged: 
specifically, measures were marked by German concern that the Commission lacked a 
sufficiently disciplinarian orientation. 
 
When the financial crisis broke, the fiscal surveillance process generated assessments that 
were tolerant and forgiving of the straits in which member states found themselves.  
Similar leniency in applying the rules in a crisis could be seen in other areas, such as state 
aid (Schelkle 2012). The immediate effect of the financial crisis was to create a short-
lived Keynesian turn in fiscal policy in Europe. Member states undertook stimulus 
programs which were endorsed and given a European label in the form of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). These programs, combined with sharp falls in GDP, 
took almost all member states across the threshold for deficits.  
 
An escape clause in the Pact provides that, in a deep recession, defined as a fall of GDP 
of more than 1.5%, Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDPs) can be suspended. However, the 
clause was not invoked: the Council decided to start EDPs against the vast majority of 
member states. The opening of an EDP forces a government to inform its peers in the 
Council in detail about its budgetary plans. In other words, given the number of 
‘delinquents’, EDPs created a venue for policy coordination in the absence of alternative 
venues. Member states were not very hard on each other: the Council agreed in October 
2009 on a general extension of the time for correction of excessive deficits, whereby 
consolidation should begin in 2011 in most member states. 
 
Two examples can illustrate the tenor of assessments at this time. Reviewing the situation 
in France in November 2009, the Council was informed that the deficit target of 5.6% of 
GDP was likely to be missed because of a greater than expected decline in GDP. The 
deficit was likely to reach 8.3% of GDP. Furthermore, the ‘minimum average structural 
effort’ (leaving out the effects of the GDP outturn) fell short of requirements, but this had 
‘to be seen in the context of the still somewhat fragile economy’. Overall, the 
Commission recommended and the Council agreed that ‘taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the economic crisis and the EERP, the French authorities can be 
considered to have taken effective action’ (CEU 2009a). Similarly, Italy’s huge deficit in 
2009 was determined to ‘have resulted from an appropriate response to the EERP and the 
free play of automatic stabilisers’ (CEU 2009b). Italy’s ‘appropriate response’ consisted 
of hardly any stimulus, in line with its precarious fiscal situation, but the ‘free play’ of in-
built stabilizers meant that the Berlusconi government refrained also from pro-cyclical 
retrenchment (Schelkle 2012). 
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This phase, whereby discretionary counter-cyclical policy was endorsed in the 
surveillance process, was brought to an end by the emerging sovereign debt crisis in 
Greece, and its contagious effects. It became clear that the no-bailout clause could not be 
enforced without risking a second Lehman moment. Furthermore, the ECB was in effect 
drawn into monetary financing of government deficits, through its operations in 
secondary bond markets. These developments created pressure for a revitalization of 
fiscal surveillance. Both Germany, as the principal guarantor of bailout funds, and the 
ECB, with a hawkish reputation to defend, pressed for stronger arrangements for fiscal 
control.  
 
Importantly, stronger controls did not have to come through the established surveillance 
process. Instead, there were opportunities to impose austerity in the loan agreements 
made with member states that had to call on the IMF and the EU for assistance. Loan 
agreements were not bound by the norms of symmetry and common agreement that were 
foundational for the fiscal surveillance process. Under IMF rules, the key criterion for a 
loan agreement was that the borrowing country should adopt a program that would enable 
it to repay. This program could prescribe a country-specific adjustment path and could 
impose requirements which lenders themselves did not comply with. 
 
There were also attempts to embed austerity in other ways. German initiatives show an 
ambivalent attitude towards the EU-led process. On the one hand, promoting collective 
self-restraint through the Council might veil the exercise of power by creditors and 
mitigate anti-German sentiment (a forlorn hope, as it turned out). On the other hand, 
Union institutions could provide venues for challenging austerity and manoeuvring 
Germany into larger contributions to collective resources. This is a plausible 
interpretation of Chancellor Merkel’s resistance to creating a new permanent competence 
for the Commission in the form of a bailout fund (Barber 2010). Germany has also 
become critical of the Commission’s leniency in its assessments of countries with 
excessive deficits that are not subject to conditionality under a loan agreement, notably 
France, Spain and Italy (Spiegel and Carnegy 2014, Spiegel 2014).  
 
Germany’s disaffection with the rigor of enforcement of fiscal surveillance by the 
Commission and Council was reflected in its initiative to create an intergovernmental 
Fiscal Compact (Chang 2013: 264). This intergovernmental treaty, outside the EU’s legal 
framework, is modeled on legal changes, among them a ‘debt brake’ (Schuldenbremse) in 
the German constitution, passed in 2009 under the Grand Coalition. The emphasis of the 
Compact is on the incorporation of fiscal restraints into domestic law. National 
parliaments are required to legislate on balanced budget rules and debt limits; failure to 
do so can be challenged in courts. Moreover, a member state who does not sign the 
Compact is not eligible for assistance from the permanent bailout fund, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Twenty-five of the then 27 member states signed the 
Compact; only the Czech Republic and the UK stayed out.  
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Table 1: Major reforms of fiscal surveillance – ‘Fiscal Compact’ 
Applicability Major provisions Major innovation 
Contracting 
parties (25 as 
of 22 July 
2013) 
Balanced Budget Rule analogous to 
the MTO; 
Automatic correction mechanism for 
debt significantly moving away from 
the 60% debt ratio 
Fiscal rules written into 
domestic law;  
access to ESM is 
conditional on signing 
up 
 
At the same time, the task force of Council President Van Rompuy, made up largely of 
the finance ministers of the Euro area members, was at work preparing proposals to 
strengthen the Commission-led process. The ‘Six Pack’ of five Regulations and one 
Directive was passed in 2011. Among its innovations was reverse qualified majority 
voting, which would make it harder for the Council to reject Commission 
recommendations. Of course this assumed that the principal obstacle to fiscal restraint 
through Community pressure was the Council, and that the Commission would make 
recommendations for compliance with fiscal rules that some states would find 
unappetizing. This reform is in line with the disciplinarian critique of the original Pact, 
which saw the principal problem of fiscal governance in the enforcement of restraint by 
‘turkeys’. Reverse majority voting appeared to strengthen the delegation of decisions to 
the Commission: a majority is now required to reject a recommendation of the 
Commission to open an EDP.  
 
The Six Pack introduced four substantive innovations that helped to establish the 
impression that fiscal surveillance was being tightened. First, sanctions now attach to 
excessive debt as well as deficits. Penalties can be levied on a debt-to-GDP ratio above 
60% (even if the deficit is not excessive) if it is not reduced by at least 0.5% over three 
years. Second, there is an intensified emphasis on the ‘medium term objective’ (MTO) of 
achieving a fiscal position ‘close to balance or in surplus’. The MTO is fulfilled if the 
structural deficit does not exceed 1% (or 0.5% for those above the debt threshold). Third, 
more checks on data validity have been introduced. Eurostat has obtained extended rights 
to visit member states and inspect primary source data; if fraud is detected, the 
government can be fined. Furthermore, the assumptions underlying GDP forecasts must 
be verified and assessed by national fiscal councils, and agreed with the Commission. 
Table 2 gives an overview. 
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Table 2: Major reforms of fiscal surveillance – ‘Six Pack’ 
Applicability Major provisions Major innovation 
All MS of the 
EU but 
sanctions 
only for EA 
countries 
SGP preventive arm: 
-definition of country-specific MTOs 
in terms of structural balances 
-annual evaluation of MTO, 
expenditure rule and debt  
-evaluation of adjustment to MTO 
with possibility of financial sanction 
Precise MTOs;  
Expenditure rule; 
financial sanction in the 
form of an interest-
bearing deposit 
All MS of the 
EU but 
sanctions 
only for EA 
countries 
SGP corrective arm: 
-surveillance of deficit (3%) and debt 
(60%) ratios to GDP 
-financial sanctions (non-interest 
bearing deposit or fine) 
- reverse majority voting on 
Commission proposals 
Excessive Deficit 
Procedure includes 
‘excessive’ debt above 
60%;  
decision rule of reverse 
majority 
All MS National fiscal frameworks: 
Mandatory minimum requirements re 
numerical fiscal rules, medium-term 
fiscal frameworks, independent fiscal 
councils etc 
GDP forecasts to be 
confirmed by 
independent national 
councils and agreed 
with the Commission 
All MS Statistical governance: 
Minimum standards for independent 
authorities; independent auditing of 
data by Eurostat; financial sanctions 
for statistical fraud 
More formal powers for 
Eurostat backed by 
sanctions 
Abbreviations: MS=Member States; EA=Euro Area 
Sources: Regulations (EU) 1173-1177/2011, Directive 2011/85/EU, available at URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/index_en.htm   
 
Heightened attention to debt levels has been interpreted as a toughening of fiscal 
surveillance, because it means that many countries will be required to exercise fiscal 
restraint for long periods, instead of coming under scrutiny only intermittently for 
breaching the deficit limit. But it is possible to read the shift of emphasis from 
‘correction’ to ‘prevention’ differently. The Commission retains considerable discretion 
to push deadlines for corrective action into the future.  
 
Commission officials drew the lesson from the standoff with member states in 2003 and 
again from the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 that the preventive arm of the Pact needed to 
be strengthened, in order to create more fiscal space for countercyclical policy. Larch et 
al (2010: 4), writing as Commission insiders (but of course in personal capacity), argue 
that the shift to a medium-term orientation is desirable because countries failed to restrain 
spending in the pre-crisis years and their fiscal positions were therefore too vulnerable to 
a downturn. This is an argument that goes against the imposition of austerity measures 
when economies are weak, but retains a role for fiscal surveillance in cautioning and 
reining in governments in good times. 
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The ‘Two Pack’ of regulations extends the monitoring of budgets over a medium-term 
horizon, with an additional emphasis on structural reforms. It also codifies the ad hoc 
arrangements adopted in loan agreements. These have been country-specific; the Two 
Pack establishes generic procedures. It sets out that countries in financial difficulties or 
receiving support from the ESM will be subject to inspection of their budget plans and 
regular mission visits to the country, unless the ESM is specifically tied to bank 
recapitalization in which case supranational banking supervision will operate (see section 
5 below and Epstein and Rhodes in this volume). It specifies the general parameters of 
loan conditions in so-called Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes (MAPs), and 
provides that these replace regular fiscal surveillance processes as long as they are in 
force. By contrast with the symmetry of other measures, the Two Pack is explicit in 
distinguishing between those countries receiving emergency support and others. Table 3 
summarizes its main provisions. 
 
Table 3: Major reforms of fiscal surveillance – ‘Two Pack’ 
Applicability Major provisions Major innovation 
EA-MS with 
or without 
excessive 
deficits or 
debt 
Gradually closer monitoring of draft 
budget plans with 3yr horizon; 
‘economic partnership programmes’ 
for structural reforms for those with 
excessive deficits 
Not only the balance 
but the composition of 
budgets under 
surveillance 
EA-MS 
experiencing 
fiscal 
difficulties  
Bi-annual MAPs with close 
monitoring of draft budget plans; 
Financial supervision where ESM 
assistance provided directly to banks 
As above;  
ECB and Financial 
Supervisory Authorities  
involved   
Abbreviations: MS=Member States; EA=Euro Area 
Sources: Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 
 
All these measures appear to secure the role of the Commission in preparing assessments 
and making recommendations. However, it is far from clear that the Commission will 
always use these powers to recommend fiscal consolidation measures, because of the 
dilemmas that arise in the statistical accounting for government interventions in an 
unprecedented financial crisis and a deep recession. We take up these issues in turn 
below. First, the surveillance process is intended to regulate governments’ budgetary 
decision-making, but, for reasons we explain in the next section, it also brings under its 
purview the fiscal consequences of reckless behavior by market actors such as banks. 
Furthermore, when we trace through exactly how bank bailouts affect the fiscal accounts, 
we find that the effects on fiscal indicators create incentives for governments to avoid 
restructuring and recapitalizing their banking systems. Hence, if the Commission insisted 
on rigorous compliance with fiscal rules, this could have the perverse consequence that 
banking problems are hidden rather than resolved. 
 
Second, the long-standing problem of how to avoid pro-cyclical adjustment through 
cyclical adjustment, and what size of cyclical margin should be allowed, has acquired a 
new dimension. Settled practice assigned the primary task of overall macroeconomic 
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stabilisation in the EA to monetary policy, leaving national fiscal policies the subsidiary 
role of addressing idiosyncratic shocks. However, the financial crisis has rendered 
monetary policy ineffective: low interest rates and liquidity creation have amounted to 
‘pushing on a string’ and economies have not been stabilized around a stable trend for 
GDP. As we explain in section 4 below, it is difficult, in determining the right fiscal 
stance, to know how to take into account the magnification of the cyclical problem that 
has occurred as a result of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
3 Accounting for the financial crisis  
The measurement of the Maastricht fiscal indicators is the job of Eurostat; the task of 
preparing macroeconomic projections and interpreting and evaluating the data falls to DG 
EcFin. The determination of deficits and debts is the subject of voluminous rules, 
covering issues such as the scope of general government and the classification of 
transactions as spending or lending. It has become clear in the aftermath of the crisis that 
some of these rules are inconvenient and others are unsuited to the conditions of 
deleveraging in depressed economic conditions. In this section, we show that the norm of 
comprehensiveness in fiscal accounting brings into the purview of fiscal surveillance 
developments that have no connection to budgetary decision-making. Furthermore, to 
maintain the appearance of neutrality and impartial judgment in assessing government 
activities, Eurostat refers to market valuations, but this is a questionable procedure when 
markets themselves have failed, and can induce pro-cyclical assessments of the fiscal 
stance, to the detriment of states in a weak fiscal position.  
 
Eurostat’s accounting for the debts and deficits of general government is dependent on 
the judgments of statisticians, who are guided by the extensive technical apparatus of the 
European System of Accounts (ESA). Notwithstanding some practical differences, ESA 
produces a similar picture of public finances to the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS). In particular, both establish a norm of comprehensiveness, whereby ‘general 
government’ is defined according to its substantive activities of non-marketised 
production and redistribution, rather than relying on legal or budgetary conventions. The 
comprehensive measure of general government means that central government, which is 
the signatory to the SGP, has to develop fiscal policy institutions which will regulate 
other parts of government, such as local governments and social security funds. This was 
an intended consequence of the definition. Not necessarily intended was that market 
entities which cease to be viable and are rescued by government are also part of ‘general 
government’. In particular, the interventions undertaken to support the banking system 
since 2008 were not part of any country’s regular budget process, but under ESA some 
(but not all) of these interventions affect general government debt and deficit measures 
for the purposes of the SGP. 
 
Comprehensiveness is considered good practice in the international fiscal policy 
community, as it ensures that priorities for the use of fiscal resources can be properly 
established and implemented. Nonetheless, there are valid choices to be made about 
which debt and deficit measures to focus on, depending on a country’s economic 
structure and political priorities. For example, since the Thatcher era, the focal point for 
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successive British governments has been the public sector borrowing requirement, where 
the ‘public sector’ is defined more broadly than ‘general government’ under ESA. The 
public sector includes publicly-owned trading entities: the Thatcher government had 
reform and privatization of these companies in its sights, whereas the EU has pursued a 
policy of neutrality on the merits of public versus private ownership of economic entities. 
It focuses on whether a company, private or public, depends on trading income or public 
funding.  
 
As governments have taken on losses arising from the financial crisis, the norm of 
comprehensiveness has been tested and restated. One of the measures in the Six Pack 
(Directive 2011/85/EU, Chapter VI) requires member states to ensure ‘the comprehensive 
scope of budgetary frameworks’, including the identification of ‘all general government 
bodies and funds which do not form part of the regular budgets’. Among the targets for 
this edict are ‘bad banks’ in public ownership, created to achieve the orderly resolution of 
impaired assets while encouraging normal banking activity to resume. Statisticians have 
to decide whether state-owned banks are primarily trading entities, in which case they are 
part of the ‘public sector’ but not ‘general government’ and so do not count towards the 
deficit under fiscal surveillance. They also have to determine whether financial support 
given by governments to banks has been matched by the acquisition of assets of equal 
value, in which case it is a ‘financial transaction’ which does not raise the fiscal deficit. If 
financial support is unlikely to be recovered, it is a ‘capital transfer’ which counts as 
government spending.  
 
In making these judgments, statisticians turn to the norm of reliance on market 
judgments. This norm reflects a widespread shift in accounting practice away from 
historic cost accounting towards ‘marking to market’, where the market is seen as 
providing objective valuations. For example, when a government purchases shares on an 
active market, ‘any excess of the price paid by the government over the prevailing market 
price is recorded as a capital transfer’ (Eurostat 2012b: 1).  Alternatively, the expected 
rate of return can be compared with ‘a sufficient’ rate of return – if the expected return on 
the now-publicly-owned assets is lower than the sufficient return for a commercial 
investor, the difference is deemed to be a capital transfer. The presence of private co-
investors is taken to indicate an adequate return, ‘since it is assumed that the private 
investors are seeking a return’ (Eurostat 2012b: 2).  
 
This approach has some affinities with the methodology used by DG Competition to 
calculate the ‘state aid’ element in government intervention: specifically with the so-
called ‘private market investor principle’ (Hancher et al 2012). But it is applied there in a 
microeconomic setting where the intervention can be scrutinized in isolation. Applying 
market valuations in an unstable macroeconomic situation introduces systematic biases 
towards deficit-increasing classifications in weak economies. Negative ‘animal spirits’ 
drive down asset prices and drive up risk premia, thus raising the rate of return that 
private co-investors would consider sufficient (Goodhart 2010).  
 
One consequence is that Eurostat’s classification decisions sometimes appear to take a 
harsh view of the fiscal position of weak economies on the European periphery, while 
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leniently evaluating stronger economies. For example, much of the Irish government’s 
bailout expenditure has been classified as capital transfer, reflecting the poor recovery 
prospects of several of the large institutions. The effect was to increase the Irish deficit by 
20.2% of GDP in 2010 and about 26% cumulatively (Eurostat 2012a: 4, 8). By contrast, 
much of the financial support to banks provided by Germany and the Netherlands has 
been classified as ‘financial transactions’. In the Netherlands, bailouts cost some 14.6% 
of GDP but, by end-2012, 10% had been recovered, validating the statistical 
classification. Not so for Germany however: while only 1.4% of the German bailout 
expenditure of 12.8% of GDP was classified as capital transfer, recovery through asset 
sales in Germany has been low so far, at only 2.0% of GDP (IMF 2013: 14, Table 5).  
 
Such differential treatment can create the impression of political bias, in this case in favor 
of Germany. But statisticians adhere to market valuation exactly because it gives them 
independence from direct political interference. The classification reflects the judgment 
of ‘the markets’ in an environment in which Germany’s economic performance is much 
stronger than that of Ireland. The classification is not necessarily wrong in its implicit 
prediction about whether bailout expenditure will be recovered. But it works to the 
detriment of weaker economies and reinforces pro-cyclical market pressures, leading to 
austerity. 
 
A similar process, of letting market valuations rule statistical classifications, is at work in 
determining how entities brought into public ownership should be classified. The 
Maastricht indicators refer to the deficit and gross debt of ‘general government’. Trading 
entities owned by the government are part of the ‘public sector’ but not part of ‘general 
government’; the latter is defined as undertaking non-market production and allocation. 
This raises the question of what constitutes sufficient autonomy and commercial viability 
to make an operation a trading entity. Trading at a loss temporarily does not jeopardize 
trading entity status, but once an entity becomes mainly dependent on government 
funding, it is reclassified into ‘general government’. 
 
Surveillance operations in several countries have produced some striking 
reclassifications. Eurostat reclassified several Greek public enterprises which led to an 
increase in government debt by 7.8% of GDP in 2009 (Irwin 2012: 11).  Eurostat argued 
that the magnitude of their losses meant that they should be accounted for as non-market 
producers and hence as part of general government. Portugal also experienced a 
considerable rise in gross public debt because of the reclassification of public enterprises. 
The adverse economic environment meant that these enterprises became mainly 
dependent on government funding, and hence they were counted as debt-increasing parts 
of general government. While justifiable in each case on narrow statistical grounds, these 
decisions create a bias against weak economies and create the impression that their 
administrations cannot be trusted, while what happened is that their economies 
deteriorated.  
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4 Fiscal surveillance in a depression  
The technical method for avoiding pro-cyclical austerity is cyclical adjustment. While the 
original Pact specified an unadjusted 3% threshold, the Commission and the Council 
moved to monitoring a ‘structural’ measure of the deficit with Stage III of EMU (Savage 
2005: 176-177). The move to cyclical adjustment was then seen as necessary because it 
was not possible to maintain compliance with rules when the regulatory target was not 
fully under the control of the regulatee.  
 
Commentators in the 2000s noted that fiscal tightening could worsen a recession, and 
therefore potentially be counterproductive for meeting fiscal targets. However, this was 
not seen as a fatal flaw in the SGP by ‘welfare maximisers’. The prevailing economic 
policy paradigm assumed that monetary policy could ensure that the economy of the Euro 
area would, in aggregate, track a stable GDP path (Schelkle and Hassel 2012). Fiscal 
policy was only necessary to address idiosyncratic shocks in individual member states. 
The Commission’s economists always had doubts about governments’ political capacities 
to implement stabilizing fiscal policies, and promoted an analysis in which 
countercyclical fiscal policy would rely on ‘automatic stabilizers’ rather than 
discretionary measures (Buti et al 2003; cf Mabbett and Schelkle 2007). Their analysis 
showed that the 3% deficit criterion, once cyclically adjusted, provided a sufficient 
margin for the automatic stabilizers to operate. 
 
The obvious difficulty presented by the financial crisis is that monetary policy is not 
effective at stabilizing or stimulating GDP. Furthermore, in this situation of a ‘liquidity 
trap’, fiscal policy may be very effective through a Keynesian multiplier mechanism. 
This effectiveness works both ways: IMF research suggested a strong negative response 
of economies to fiscal consolidation in times of deep recession (Blanchard and Leigh 
2013). This research, showing that in times of economic depression fiscal policy can be 
powerful while monetary policy amounts to ‘pushing on a string’, generated a heated 
controversy about the wisdom of adhering to fiscal rules in Europe.  
 
Critics of the IMF’s view rely on a different theory of the relationship between the fiscal 
stance and economic outturns: the theory of ‘growth friendly fiscal consolidation’, also 
known as non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; 
Blyth 2013: 57-58, 131-2). It is hard to know whether advocates really believed this 
theory, or whether they were more concerned about the implications of the multiplier 
theory for mediating fiscal relationships in the Euro area. Certainly the intervention in the 
debate of the then Commissioner for the Euro, Olli Rehn, focused on the implications for 
fiscal governance. Faced with discussion among finance ministers of the possibility that 
fiscal multipliers were so large that austerity could worsen deficits, Rehn sent an open 
letter in an attempt to close off ‘a debate that has not been helpful.’ (Rehn 2013a)  He 
argued that ‘the confidence that we have painstakingly built up in numerous late-night 
meetings’ was eroded by airing the possibility of fiscal stimulus. Plans for Eurobonds and 
ECB interventions were no substitute for a ‘stability culture’. 
 
Rehn insisted on the inadmissibility of the discussion of fiscal multipliers, as this would 
undermine the case for fiscal restraint and control. However, his officials faced a different 
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problem. They have to assess member states’ forecasts of GDP and evaluate their 
consistency with fiscal plans. It cannot be ruled out that fiscal policy affects GDP; if this 
is ignored, then forecasts will be incorrect. The ‘Codes of Conduct’ – the guides to 
preparing surveillance reports – prepared by Rehn’s officials suggest that they were not 
convinced that fiscal multiplier effects can be discounted. The guide for all member states 
(in and out of the euro area) simply states that assumptions on real GDP growth should be 
underpinned by an indication of the expected demand contributions to growth (CEC 
2012: 14). The code for euro area states, revised in 2013, is more explicit. It asks 
reporting countries to specify the assumptions on which their GDP estimates are based, 
including ‘the estimated impact on economic growth of the aggregated budgetary 
measures envisaged in the [draft budget plan]’ (CEC 2013: 3). This estimate is also 
itemised in the report’s first table on macroeconomic prospects.   
 
The possible endogeneity of GDP with respect to fiscal policy provides a good reason for 
officials to keep their eyes firmly on the medium term as facilitated by the Six Pack 
reform. It also suggests that policy recommendations to adopt structural reforms to 
promote growth are less likely to have perverse effects than recommendations to raise 
taxes or cut expenditure. And this is exactly what we find in the Commission’s 
assessments. Member states are repeatedly urged to adopt ‘growth friendly structural 
measures’ drawn from a limited and familiar menu: pension reform, improvements to 
public administration, changes to wage-setting institutions, and measures to liberalize the 
services sector and network industries. 
 
The Commission itself is under surveillance for the accuracy of its assessments, and its 
approach to structural adjustment has been subject to some criticism.2 In a deep and 
prolonged depression, there are inevitably doubts about whether economies will return to 
their previous levels of productive capacity. The Commission has been criticized for its 
estimates in the current downturn. It uses a production function methodology to estimate 
potential GDP and output gaps (D'Auria et al 2010). This requires it to determine the 
available productive inputs, converted by the production function into an estimate of 
potential output. Controversially, the Commission’s estimates of potential employment 
track actual employment rather closely for some countries. Spain, Portugal and Ireland 
are all estimated as having experienced strong and sharp increases in the level of 
structural unemployment in recent years.3  This has the effect of raising the 
Commission’s estimates of the structural deficit and the adjustment effort required to 
restore fiscal balance. This controversy also highlights that fiscal austerity may not be the 
best way to reach structural targets: measures to enhance labor market flexibility or 
deregulate the service sector could be adopted instead, and the Commission’s 
recommendations have taken on precisely this tenor.  
 
                                                 
2
 See the review in a blog by the Bruegel Institute: http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1176-
blogs-review-the-structural-balance-controversy/ as well as the campaign for different measurement of 
structural balances by Zsolt Darvas from Bruegel: http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1170-mind-
the-gap-and-the-way-structural-budget-balances-are-calculated/  
3
 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2012/pdf/ecp_455_en.pdf in 
Graph 1.  
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5 Trapped under the lamp-post 
One way of summarizing the previous two sections is that fiscal surveillance, created to 
keep national fiscal policies from spilling over into the conduct of the common monetary 
policy, has been encroached on and encumbered by the fiscal fallout of the crisis. 
Government books show the impact of a deep recession and impaired banking systems, 
neither of which could be tackled decisively by the ECB, though not for want of trying 
(see Henning in this volume). The fiscal surveillance process seems to still hold fiscal 
authorities to account for calamities that are outside their control.  
 
In this section we ask what it would take to separate monetary, financial and fiscal policy 
so that fiscal surveillance could focus on fiscal policy. An argument for removing the 
spillovers from distressed banks has been cogently advanced by Wyplosz (2013). 
Drawing on a comparison of EA fiscal governance with fiscal rules in US states, Wyplosz 
notes that the monetary functions of EA members present difficulties in designing and 
implementing a fiscal rule. In the US, the federal authorities have the resources and 
authority to bail out and resolve banks; thus banking problems do not find their way onto 
state budgets. The creation of a banking union with a European-wide resolution fund is 
therefore of central importance, because ‘bailouts of financial institutions have 
historically been the main reason why governments lost control of their public debts.’ 
(Wyplosz 2013: 33)  
 
Most commentators agree on the necessity for a joint bank resolution fund, accompanied 
by the strengthening of supranational regulation under the auspices of the ECB. However, 
there are different views of the ‘legacy’ problem of accounting for the financial crisis. 
Under existing accounting rules, ‘defeasance structures’ or ‘bad banks’ are part of general 
government. Eurostat issued guidance in 2009 to the effect that ‘Government-owned 
special purpose entities, which have as their purpose to conduct specific government 
policies (for example with regard to defeasance or recapitalisation) with no autonomy of 
decision, are to be classified in the general government sector’ (Eurostat 2009: 5). This 
meant that their debt would become part of general government debt, and any ongoing 
deficits of those entities would add to the government deficit. An implication of this 
decision is that governments which lack fiscal room for manoeuvre should avoid creating 
defeasance structures, and instead leave impaired assets inside the originating banks to be 
gradually worked out. But this is widely thought to be a counterproductive strategy that 
leads to a ‘Japan scenario’: it hides problems and postpones a return to normal operations 
in the banking system. 
 
It might be thought that all the EU authorities would share an interest in avoiding the 
Japan scenario and supporting ways to enable member states to recapitalize banks 
without breaching the fiscal rules. From the ECB’s point of view, one implication of 
putting off recapitalization is that banks are left to rebuild their balance sheets by taking 
cheap loans from the ECB and earning a margin from on-lending. The more banks rely 
on this process, the larger the gap between the ECB’s policy rate and bank lending rates 
has to be, and the longer this gap will have to persist, impairing the transmission of low 
policy interest rates onto lending conditions.  
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However, the Commission and the ECB have not seen eye-to-eye on the desirability of 
establishing separate bank resolution mechanisms. Their different positions crystallized 
around a proposal by Spain to use an ESM loan to recapitalize its banks (Blackstone and 
House 2012). The Spanish government sought to avoid the political embarrassment of a 
lending program, with the imposition of conditionality and loss of sovereignty that would 
imply. Instead, it proposed, in the context of proposals for a banking union, that the ESM 
should undertake a lending program to Spanish banks that did not go via the accounts of 
the Spanish government. Loans to recapitalize banks could be made via supranational 
institutions and accounted for separately to the main assessment of government debt. 
 
The ECB argued against this proposal. It recognised the problem that Spain could put off 
resolving the problems of its banking sector, and that this would mean that Spanish banks 
would draw heavily on ECB resources. Its preferred solution was that the Council should 
have enhanced powers to compel a member state to receive assistance (ECB 2012: 3). 
Having been compelled to take out a loan to fix its banking system, a state would be 
required to prepare a MAP. Contrary to the argument that fiscal and banking problems 
should be separated out, it argued that, because of the ‘close relationship between fiscal 
sustainability and financial sector instability’, government debt sustainability should be 
(re)assessed if a member state received a loan to recapitalize financial institutions (ECB 
2012: 5-6).   
 
It is possible to identify some reasons for the ECB’s insistence on ‘inseparability’. One 
reason is that governments have got around the prohibition on direct ECB sovereign 
lending by selling bonds to their own banks, which have in turn converted them into cash 
at the ECB’s discount window. Bank and sovereign finances in several countries have 
become very closely linked (De Grauwe 2011). While some accounts of this ‘doom loop’ 
see it as originating with government rescues of banks, it is also possible for the process 
to be fed by large budget deficits originating in poor fiscal conduct, such as low rates of 
tax collection. It can also be argued that fiscal responsibility and regulatory conduct are 
linked: thus Wyplosz (while supportive of separating monetary from fiscal regulation) 
raises (but does not answer) the question of whether ‘the authorities in Ireland and Spain 
.. [would] have allowed the housing market bubbles had they known for sure that the 
eventual costs would be borne entirely by their taxpayers’ (Wyplosz 2013: fn 21). More 
generally, governments have proved resistant to complete independence for financial 
regulators, and critics argue that they do not have clean hands when it comes to resolving 
the problems that deficient regulation has caused (Quintyn et al 2007). 
 
While the ECB has insisted on the links between fiscal and financial sector governance, 
the Commission has taken the opposite approach. It seeks to distinguish financial from 
fiscal (mis-)conduct, notably by making it clear that bank recapitalizations will not 
produce adverse verdicts under existing surveillance processes. In a letter to finance 
ministers in October 2013, Olli Rehn spelled out how capital injections would affect 
Member States’ standing in relation to the debt and deficit criteria in the Pact. There is no 
way to exclude these interventions from the statistical measures of debt and deficits, but 
they can be ‘taken into account as a relevant factor’ in DG Ecfin’s assessment of 
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compliance. The aim of the letter was to establish, or at least to assert, ‘that the EU fiscal 
rules provide no disincentive’ to publicly financed bank recapitalizations (Rehn 2013b).  
 
Epstein and Rhodes (in this volume) offer some partial support for the ECB’s position, 
arguing that EU states have tried to retain domestic control over their banking sectors, to 
ensure that their government bonds are readily taken up and/or to pursue other public 
policy purposes such as promoting lending to SMEs. This in turn made them willing to 
bail out their banks when it might have been better to wind some down: ‘states have 
taken on the enormous fiscal burden of bailing out their own banks, in large measure to 
keep domestic banks domestic’ (Epstein and Rhodes, p.9). This points to moral hazard if 
states are let off the hook of paying for bank recapitalization: they will not have fiscal 
incentives to ensure proper regulation in the future.  
 
However, even if political fingers can be found in banking pies, banking and fiscal 
problems have to be separated if fiscal rules are to be enforceable. The approach 
embraced by the Commission is to establish a supranational system of banking 
supervision to regulate access to supranational resources for bank resolution. Ultimately, 
this should achieve a genuine separation of fiscal (or, more precisely, budgetary) policy 
from monetary policy, preventing both the distortion of monetary policy for budgetary 
purposes and the imposition of financial sector losses on government budgets. A number 
of steps have been taken in this direction, as Epstein and Rhodes document. A key barrier 
is that supranational bank resolution means pooling financial resources and allowing 
quasi-fiscal transfers. These transfers can only be separated from national budgets by the 
creation of supranational funds, and the ESM is a first step. 
 
Addressing the budgetary consequences of banking crises would go a long way to 
reducing the pressure for austerity on EA governments. It is not the only step required, 
however. More capacity to implement a countercyclical fiscal policy across the EA is 
evidently needed. This is ignored by advocates of ‘decentralized’ enforcement of fiscal 
rules, whereby voters insist on fiscal discipline, spurred on by the judgments of bond 
markets (Wyplosz 2013, Kelemen and Teo 2014). Kelemen and Teo examine why and 
how US states comply with their fiscal rules (most have self-imposed budget balance 
conditions) and find that the bond markets impose effective sanctions. Delinquent states 
are quickly punished: governments that bring forward non-compliant budgets find 
themselves faced with a lower rating and higher spreads, and are pushed into revising 
their plans. But US states and EA states differ in a number of important respects, not least 
that, in the former, the Federal Reserve looks after financial stability and the federal 
government can implement a countercyclical policy.  
 
The IMF has advocated fiscal expansion on the part of those EA member states that can 
afford it: in other words, those not subject to bond market attacks. In our view, it would 
be better to establish a debt instrument to insure member states against bond market 
attacks, which could also regulate access to the common resource of low-interest public 
finance for EA members (Mabbett and Schelkle 2010, CAE 2013: point 6). Given the 
periodic failure of monetary policy, it would be desirable to be able to determine a 
countercyclical fiscal stance for the EA as a whole, and to be able to finance a fiscal 
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expansion if needed, regardless of the verdicts of the bond markets (Dullien and 
Schwarzer 2009). 
 
In summary, fiscal surveillance in the EA would have more chance of operating 
effectively if it had a narrower remit. But the remit can only be narrowed if new 
supranational institutions are built. Removing the fiscal costs of bank bailouts from 
member states’ budgets calls for a supranational resolution fund. Protecting member 
states against contagious bond market attacks calls for a joint liability Eurobond, as does 
countercyclical macroeconomic management in the face of monetary doldrums. So long 
as the EA does not have these institutions, the fiscal surveillance process struggles: a 
puny Atlas with the whole burden of macroeconomic regulation on its shoulders. 
6 Conclusion 
The evolution of fiscal surveillance has a less straightforward trajectory than either 
disciplinarians or their critics generally care to notice or admit. Our analysis suggests that 
the propensity to look for everything under the fiscal surveillance lamppost is due to the 
institutional structure: the norms governing accounting for crisis, the responsibility of 
governments for ‘their’ banks, and the assignment of the task of overall macroeconomic 
stabilization to monetary policy.  
 
We have tried to show that, while the dice in fiscal surveillance are at times loaded 
against economies in recession, this is a product of the rules and methods used by 
Eurostat and DG EcFin, rather than being the result of an austerity delusion. On the 
contrary, at the enforcement stage, DG Ecfin has been rather lenient with the member 
states that have not met their budget targets, and has provoked a public stand-off with 
major guarantor countries such as Germany and Finland (Spiegel and Carnegy 2014, 
Spiegel 2014). France, Italy and Spain were seen as getting overly favorable treatment. 
 
The difficulties facing the Commission are illustrated by the two faces of the former 
Commissioner for the Euro, Ollie Rehn: apparently the disciplinarian in finding a 
discussion about fiscal multipliers ‘not helpful’, but signalling clearly that the 
Commission will take a lenient view of the fiscal costs of bank recapitalization. We find 
Rehn’s position explicable, if not entirely consistent. The potential effect of the fiscal 
stance on the macroeconomic outturn is a long-standing problem in fiscal surveillance, 
and the Commission has established a limited concession to it, holding that the 3% 
threshold provides enough fiscal space given that the indicator is cyclically adjusted. This 
may not really be so in the current liquidity trap, but the Commission was reluctant to 
give way, especially as the countries most likely to seize on any extra fiscal space were 
those with the largest macroeconomic imbalances and the weakest fiscal positions. Bank 
bailouts, by contrast, are an issue that has faced the Commission only since the financial 
crisis, and there Rehn could find that discretion is the better part of valor without 
undermining a long-standing compromise or showing excessive partiality to the interests 
of a few countries. 
 
While Rehn has to look for political solutions acceptable to the member states, we have 
provided evidence in this chapter that the approach taken by Eurostat and DG EcFin is 
18 
 
fundamentally technocratic. Governance by experts means varying the implementation of 
established rules and procedures in the light of the evolving consensus among peers. The 
Commission has no reason to apply a rule mechanically if it can see a better alternative. It 
may take the view that governments are failing to adopt optimal fiscal policies, but that 
will not lead it to enforce a rule if the result would be a third-best outcome. However, it is 
not open to the Commission to propose replacing the focal points of the general 
government deficit and gross debt with more robust measures. The best it can do is to 
point out the issues in its evaluations and spread the light by adding more rules and 
indicators, as it has done through the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (see 
Marzinotti in this volume). The Commission is stuck with the fiscal surveillance 
lamppost, but it is too sentient to believe that it will find the key there. 
 
Our account suggests that reforms to fiscal surveillance that have attracted a lot of 
attention are actually unlikely to be important. In particular, we expect reverse majority 
voting to make little difference. Reverse voting matters according to the disciplinarian 
analysis that the problem of fiscal surveillance is self-enforcement by ‘turkeys’.  There is 
no room in this analysis to doubt whether an expert body would be in favor of upholding 
the fiscal rules. We have argued that there are, and should be, such doubts. They arise 
because fiscal surveillance is implicated in solving the joint monetary, financial and fiscal 
problems of the EA. Comparisons of the EA with the USA, such as that offered by 
Kelemen and Teo (2014), fail to pay sufficient attention to the much wider 
macroeconomic and financial roles of EA governments. The logic of fiscal rules is that 
governments should be like orderly households, living within their means. The larger the 
role of the government, the less viable is this view, and the more likely is it that a 
disciplinarian stance is so welfare-reducing as to be untenable. 
 
We have suggested that the monetary and financial roles of EA governments could be 
curtailed, but only if those roles were transferred to supranational institutions. A banking 
union and a minimum of fiscal integration in the form of a joint debt instrument would 
help to distinguish between government and market failure, moral hazard and genuine 
insurance cases, fiscal causes and fiscal consequences of a crisis. As long as these 
policies are not in place, fiscal surveillance remains the main game in town, despite its 
evident limitations. 
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